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CoNFLICT OF LAWS-CUSTODY DECREES-JURISDICTION To MODIFY AND
EFFECT IN SISTER STATES-Husband and wife were divorced in Wisconsin
in 1956 by a judgment which awarded alimony, custody of the children,
and support money to W. The custody decree provided that W be permitted to remove the children to California but that they be allowed to
visit H each summer. While H was visiting California in October 1957, he
was served in an action commenced by W seeking absolute custody. H returned to Wisconsin and on November 5 asked the Wisconsin court to
modify its divorce judgment by awarding custody of the children to him.
T.llat court set a hearing and issued orders requiring W to show cause and
restraining her from proceeding in the California action until the hearing,
which orders were personally delivered to W. On December 12, the California court granted W an order which limited H's visiting rights. In
January 1958, the Wisconsin court held that it had retained continuing
jurisdiction, that it was not bound by the California action, and that W
had willfully violated the Wisconsin restraining order. The court ordered
that, pending Ws compliance with the original Wisconsin custody award,
the court clerk should not forward to her the alimony paid in by H. On
appeal, held, reversed and dismissed. Both states had jurisdiction over
parties and the question of custody, but since the California action had
already been commenced the Wisconsin court should have declined to entertain H's application. Brazy v. Brazy, 5 Wis. (2d) 352, 92 N.W. (2d) 738
(1958).
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The questions of what constitutes jurisdiction to issue or modify child
custody decrees and what effect the full faith and credit clause of the
United States Constitution1 requires other states to give such decrees have
been extremely troublesome to the courts. The problem underlying both
questions is a conflict between the state's concern for the welfare of children
domiciled or temporarily present within its borders, and the undesirability
of parents going from one jurisdiction to another seeking favorable custody awards.2 In resolving this conflict in terms of jurisdiction, the courts
have subscribed to one of three different theories.3 Some base jurisdiction
over the matter of a child's custody on in personam jurisdiction over the
parents, the theory being that when both parties are before the court their
legal relations as to the child may be there determined.4 Other states regard the question of custody as one of status and, as such, subject only
to the control of the state in which the child is domiciled.I> According to
the third theory the basic problem is to determine what is in the best
interest of the child, and, as the state in which the child is physically
present is the most qualified to determine this, that state has exclusive, or
at least concurrent, jurisdiction to do so.6 In the principal case the question
of jurisdiction is complicated by an additional factor. There is no doubt

U.S. CONST., art. 4, §1.
In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881), is the leading case to the effect that a decree of
custody is based upon local concern for the best interests of the child. In Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N.Y. 429 at 431, 148 N.E. 624 (1925), Justice Cardozo stated the classic principle for
balancing the tivo interests: "The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of infants
found within its territory ..• has its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless. • • • But the limits of the jurisdiction are suggested by its origin. The
residence of the child may not be used as a pretense for the adjudication of the status of
parents whose domicile is elsewhere, nor for the definition of parental rights dependent
upon status." Compare CONFLICT OF LA.ws RESTATEMENT §148 (1934). In applying the
Cardozo principle courts have tended to emphasize one interest or the other. Compare
Aufiero v. Aufiero, 332 Mass. 149, 123 N.E. (2d) 709 (1955), with Shippen v. Bailey, 303
Ky. 10, 196 S.W. (2d) 425 (1946). The type of abuse courts strive to prevent is revealed
by the facts of Weddington v. Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E. (2d) 71 (1956), and
Allen v. Allen, 200 Ore. 678, 268 P. (2d) 358 (1954). In the latter case the children had
been subjected to seven custodial disputes in nine years. See generally Ehrenzweig, "Interstate Recoguition of Custody Decrees," 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 345 (1953).
SRESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONTINUED, CONFLICT OF LAws §117, p. 55 (Tent. Draft
'J.'!o. 1, 1953).
4 Burgo v. Burgo, (D.C. Alaska 1957) 149 F. Supp. 932; Krasnow v. Krasnow, 140
Conn. 254, 99 A. (2d) 104 (1953). Contra, Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N.C. 218, 69 S.E. (2d) 313
(1952).
o Griffen v. Griffen, 95 Ore. 78, 187 P. (2d) 598 (1920); Application of Enke, 129
Mont. 353, 287 P. (2d) 19 (1955), cert. den. 350 U.S. 923 (1955); Rodney v. Adams, (Ky.
1954) 268 s.w. (2d) 940; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws §144.3 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT
OF LAws, 3d ed., §136 (1949); CONFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT §117 (1934). But see Stumberg, "The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws," 8 UNIV. Cm. L. R.Ev. 42 (1940); 9
A.L.R. (2d) 434, 439 (1950).
6 Weddington v. Weddington, note 2 supra; Glasier v. Glasier, 153 N.Y.S. (2d) 788
(1956); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws, 2d ed., 326 (1951); Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law -Across State Lines," 10 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 819 (1944); note, 47 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 703 (1949). See the general discussion in 4 A.L.R. (2d) 7 (1949). No single one of the
1

2
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that California had jurisdiction as to the matter of custody, since the
requirements of all three theories were met. But the Wisconsin court asserted that it too had jurisdiction by virtue of provisions in the original
divorce judgment that the rights of the parties were subject to possible
further orders7 and a state statute providing for subsequent alterations
of such judgments.s Most courts subscribe to this concept of continuing
jurisdiction, at least insofar as the ability to modify their own judgments
is concerned. And usually in order to exercise it no more is demanded
than personal jurisdiction over the parents, which often is said to have remained in the court as a consequence of the original proceeding.9 If it is
conceded that both states had jurisdiction, then the second issue raised by
custody awards is presented. What effect should the original Wisconsin
judgment have been given by the California court, and what significance
should the California change have had in the Wisconsin court? The issue
these questions present is different from that of jurisdiction, though the
two often are confused, and actually is one for the United States Supreme
Court. That Court thus far has refrained from deciding whether a custody
judgment is made binding on other states by the full faith and credit
clause.10 However, it has declared that a state may modify a foreign decree

three theories of jurisdiction seems to be completely adequate to allow a court to intervene
in every situation in which its action is desirable. See, e.g., Sampsell v. Superior Court,
32 Cal. (2d) 763, 197 P. (2d) 739 (1948).
7 Principal case at 742.
8 2 Wis. Stat. (1957) §§247.24 to 247.25.
9 Koelsch v. Rone, 3 Ill. (2d) 483, 121

N.E. (2d) 738 (1954); Van Grundy v. Van
Grundy, 244 Iowa 488, 56 N.W. (2d) 43 (1953); Burkhardt v. Bachrack, (Tex. Civ. App.
1950) 225 s.w. (2d) 1022; CONFLICT OF LAws R.EsTATEMENT §76 (1934); R.EsTATEMENT OF
THE I.Aw, p. 97, comment c, 1948 Supp. (1949). See also Stansbury, "Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," IO I.Aw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 819 (1944). Contra, Milner
v. Gatlin, (Tex. 1924) 261 S.W. 1003; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 166 Ohio St. 203, 141
N.E. (2d) 172 (1957).
10 Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958), concerned a holding by North Carolina that
when the children became domiciled in that state after their custody had been awarded
to H by New York, a New York modification awarding custody to W was not entitled to
full faith and credit. The Supreme Court remanded for a determination of whether the
holding was based upon a change in circumstances after the New York modification. It
refused to decide whether in the absence of such change full faith and credit would be
required. The state courts have taken various positions on the question. Some hold that
in the interest of the welfare of any child physically present within the state they can
examine all the pertinent facts including those upon which the original judgment was
based. In re Bort, note 2 supra. See generally Reese and Johnson, "The Scope of Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments," 49 CoL. L. R.Ev. 153 at 171 (1949); 72 A.L.R. 441 (1931).
Other states rule that a foreign decree is res judicata as to the facts upon which it was
based but that they can change the award upon a showing of a change in circumstances.
White v. White, 160 Kan. 32, 159 P. (2d) 461 (1945); Miller v. Schneider, (Tex. Civ. App.
1943) 170 s.w. (2d) 301. See CONFLICT OF LAws R.EsTATEMENT §147, comment a (1934). But
see R.EsTATEMENT OF THE I.Aw SECOND, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§144-144 (a), pp. 142-145 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1957). Occasionally a court decides it cannot as a foreign court alter a properly rendered custody decree at all, or at least not beyond making temporary provisions
effective only within the state. Butts v. Collins, 129 Mont. 440, 289 P. (2d) 949 (1955).
Cf. Light v. Light, 12 Ill. (2d) 502, 147 N.E. (2d) 34 (1957).
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where the rendering state had the right to modify its own order, although
only under the same conditions under which the original state could act.11
Since Wisconsin courts can modify their custody judgments on a showing
of substantial change in circumstances,12 the California court had the power
to alter the award as it did in the principal case, since such a change apparently was shown by W. Thus the Wisconsin court was confronted with
the question of what effect to give the properly rendered California decree.
Wisconsin has indicated its willingness to alter foreign decrees if changed
circumstances are present,13 but H had not attempted to show there were
such changes since the California action. Thus by its own rules the court
could not but hold as it did, although the decision seemingly was based on
principles of comity. While the opinion will be of little assistance to lower
courts and attorneys in Wisconsin,14 the outcome is both realistic and
desirable. The children were in California, and in such situations that state
has not felt constrained to honor decrees such as the Wisconsin trial court
had issued.1 5 Also, the California court was in a better position to investigate what was best for the children's welfare and whether their interests
were being furthered by their mother's custody. While the Wisconsin court
here arrived at a satisfactory solution to the problem that is posed when two
states have issued conflicting awards, the. problem itself remains to perplex. It is unreasonable to expect that fifty courts will independently
arrive at an identical solution, but the problem will remain until they do
or until the United States Supreme Court resolves at least the full faith and
credit aspect of it. In the meantime, regardless of jurisdictional theories,
it is hoped that courts will strive to reach results as ultimately sensible as
those of the Wisconsin court.16
Donald R. Jolliffe, S.Ed.

11 New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). The Court also has held
that when a court lacks personal jurisdiction over a parent its decree cutting off the
parent's immediate right to custody of children need not be accorded full faith and credit.
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), noted, 52 MICH. L. R.Ev. 594 (1954).
12 Application of Ratte!, 244 Wis. 261, 12 N.W. (2d) 135 (1943). See also Pollock v.
Pollock, 273 Wis. 233, 77 N.W. (2d) 485 (1956). And see generally 28 Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957)
p. 477, n. 46 and p. 480, n. 2.
13 State ex rel. Hannon v. Eisler, 270 Wis. 469, 71 N.W. (2d) 376 (1955).
14 It is difficult to determine which statements by the court may be considered dicta
in later cases.
15 Re Lee's Guardianship, 123 Cal. App. (2d) 882,267 P. (2d) 847 (1954); Stout v. Pate,
120 Cal. App. (2d) 699, 261 P. (2d) 788 (1953) (situation similar to that in the principal
case).
16 See the similar result in Remick v. Remick, 204 Okla. 345, 229 P. (2d) 600 (1951).

